Sandy City, a municipal corporation v. Salt Lake County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County Planning Commission, K. Delyn Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W. Scott Kjar, Steven E. Smoot, Postero-Blecker, Inc., and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Sandy City, a municipal corporation v. Salt Lake
County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah,
Salt Lake County Planning Commission, K. Delyn
Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W. Scott Kjar, Steven E.
Smoot, Postero-Blecker, Inc., and Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Walter R. Miller; Sandy City Attorney; Attorney for Appellant.
Brinton R. Burbidge; Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell; Leonard J. Lewis; John W. Andrews; Van
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy; David E. Yocom; Salt Lake County Attorney; Kent S. Lewis;
Deputy County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, No. 880429 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1236
7 JMENT 
<: U 
MO 
)OCKET NO. 
BRIEF 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs . 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, K. DELYN YEATES, 
R. SCOTT PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC. and CHEVRON 
U.S.A., INC., 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 880429-CA 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
CLASSIFICATION 14(b) 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION OF THE 
HONORABLE RAYMOND UNO OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 
WALTER R. MILLER 
Sandy City Attorney 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
(801) 566-1561 
Attorney for Appellant 
BRINTON R. BURBIDGE 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3680 
Attorney for Respondents 
Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smo 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
KENT S. LEWIS (1945) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
(801) 468-3420 
Attorney for Respondents Salt 
Lake County & Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission 
ot 
LEONARD J. LEWIS & JOHN W. ANDREWS 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main St., Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Respondents Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
FILED 
NOV 141988 
COURT OF APPEALS 
n c u t i v t U JAi 
rfdS aasw 
THE OFFICE OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
COUNTY ATTORNEY 
WALTER R ELLETT. CHIEF DEPUTY 
JUSTICE DIVISION 
WILLIAM R HYDE, CHIEF DEPUTY 
CIVIL DIVISION 
DONALD SAWAYA. CHIEF DEPUTY 
GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES DIVISION 
January 17, 1989 
Ms. Mary Noonan 
Court Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, et al. 
Case No. 880429-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
This is to advise the Court that in the captioned matter 
respondent Salt Lake County relies on the case of Davis County 
v. Clearfield City, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, No. 860343-CA, as 
additional authority in support of its position that the scope 
of judicial review in this case is limited to a review of the 
record of the zoning proceedings before Salt Lake County and, 
therefore, the District Court acted within its discretion in 
deciding the matter on summary judgment. This position is set 
forth on pages 13-14 of Salt Lake County's brief on file with 
the Court. 
The reason for citing this supplemental authority is 
that the case of Davis County v. Clearfield City involved a 
judicial review of a conditional use decision by Clearfield 
City and this Court in its opinion clearly articulates the 
scope of the judicial review of such a zoning decision. The 
case herein also involves a judicial review of a conditional 
use decision. 
2001 SOUTH STATE STREET SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 9 a 1200 
Ms, Mary Noonan, Court Clerk 
January 18 , 1989 
Page Two 
Sali Lake County intends Lu argue the applicability of 
the Court's decision in Davis County v. Clearfield Citv to the 
case herein during the oral argument of this case. 
Very truly yours, 
KENT S, LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Civil Division 
Telephone: (80lI 1dH i4, 0 
rt/646 
pc: Walter R. Miller 
John w. Andrews 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, K. DELYN YEATES, 
R. SCOTT PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC. and CHEVRON 
U.S.A., INC., 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 880429-CA 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
CLASSIFICATION 14(b) 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION OF THE 
HONORABLE RAYMOND UNO OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 
WALTER R. MILLER 
Sandy City Attorney 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
(801) 566-1561 
Attorney for Appellant 
BRINTON R. BURBIDGE 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3680 
Attorney for Respondents 
Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
KENT S. LEWIS (1945) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
(801) 468-3420 
Attorney for Respondents Salt 
Lake County & Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission 
ANDREWS 
& MCCARTHY 
500 
LEONARD J. LEWIS & JOHN W. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
50 South Main St., Suite It 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Respondents Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW. 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY AND ORDINANCE PROVISIONS . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
I. NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN 
LOWER COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
II. STATEMF.TJ.' <W I INI'.H SPTTFn FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED UTAH 
STATUTES APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. . . . . . . . . . 9 
A. THIS CASE IS NOT AN ANNEXATION CASE . . . . . . 9 
B. THE CHEVRON DEVELOPMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
§10-2-418 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 
II. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT UPHOLDING THE COUNTY'S APPROVAL OF THE 
CHEVRON CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. . . . . . . . . . . 14 
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS LIMITED TO 
A DETERMINATION BY THE COURT THAT THERE IS 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD DEMONSTRATING A 
REASONABLE BASIS IN SUPPORT OF THE DECISION 
OF THE COUNTY APPROVING THE CHEVRON CONDI-
TIONAL USE PERMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 
8. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD WAS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
C. APPROVAL OF THE CHEVRON STATION WAS CON-
SISTENT WITH THE COUNTY'S CONDITIONAL USE 
ORDINANCE . . . . . . . . .16 
D. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BASED ON THE RECORD IN THIS CASE .19 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Bone v. Citv of Lewiston, 693 P.2d 104 6 (Id. 19 64), . 
City of Louisville v. District Court, City of Boulder, 
54 3 P. 2d 67 (Co, 1975) 
Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn. v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 
(Ut. 1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Crestwood Holladay Home Owners Assn., Inc. v. Engh 
Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Ut. 1976). . . . . . . . 
Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 255 P.2d 7 23 
(Ut. 1 9 53), . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 
Gavland v. Salt Lake County, 3S8 f 23 63 3 (Ut. 1961} 
Marshall v. Salt Lake Citv, 141 P.2d ?04 Pit 1943 . . . 
Navlor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 3^ b
 :\ ^3 . 
(Ut. 1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Navlor v. Salt Lake Citv Corporation, 1 Lc L ,:\ * --4 
y U W . X =/ D D y • • P © e . • . . e m e o t> c . e *:• . t 
Paulsen v. Hooper Street Improvement District, 6b6 P.2; 
459 (Ut. 1982), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Peatross v. Board of County Commissioners, 55 5 P,2d 
281(Ut. 1976). . . . . 
Town of Navlor v. Mt. Kesco, v3 N.Y,S 2d l?8. 3 06 N.E.2d 
155 (1973). . . . . .
 : . 
Other Authorities: 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances (1986) 
§19*84*090* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,.3; 
Utah Code Ann. §10-1-104(1] ) (J 9 79) . . 3, 
Utah Code Amu §10-2-416 (1979) . . . . . , . . . . . . . 
- i i 
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 (1979) 2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 20 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-27 (1953) 12 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-3 2 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 4 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 569c) 16 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65(b)(2) 15 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is a response to an appeal by Sandy City from an 
Order and Judgment of Dismissal entered by the Honorable 
Raymond Uno of the Third Judicial Court in Salt Lake County 
granting the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants, This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann, §78-2a-3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court correctly hold that the 
approval by Salt Lake County of construction of the Chevron gas 
station did not violate Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418? 
2. Does the record support the decision of the District 
Court upholding the approval by Salt Lake County of a 
conditional use permit for the Chevron station? 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY 
AND ORDINANCE PROVISIONS 
The relevant statutory and ordinance provisions for this 
appeal are: 
1. Utah Code Ann,§10-2-418 (1979), which reads as 
follows: 
"Urban development shall not be approved or 
permitted within one-half mile of a municipality 
in the unincorporated territory which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal expansion 
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in its policy declaration, if a municipality is 
willing to annex the territory proposed for such 
development under the standards and requirements 
set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that 
a property owner desiring to develop or improve 
property within the said one-half mile area may 
notify the municipality in writing of said desire 
and identify with particularity all legal and 
factual barriers preventing an annexation to the 
municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months 
from the filing with the municipality of said 
notice and after a good faith and diligent effort 
by said property owner to annex, said property 
owner may develop as otherwise permitted by law. 
Urban development beyond one-half mile of a 
municipality may be restricted or an impact 
statement required when agreed to in an interlocal 
agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal 
Cooperation Act. 
2. Utah Code Ann. 10-1-104(11) (1979), which reads 
follows: 
"(11) 'Urban development1 means a housing 
subdivision involving more than 15 residential 
units with an average of less than one acre per 
residential unit or a commercial or industrial 
development for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases." 
3. Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake County Code 
Ordinances 1986, which reads as follows: 
"Conditions for approval. The planning commission 
shall not authorize a conditional use permit 
unless the evidence presented is such as to 
establish: 
A. That the proposed use at the particular 
location is necessary or desirable to provide a 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
community; and, 
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B. That such use will not, under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious 
to property or improvements in the vicinity; and, 
C. That the proposed use will comply with 
the regulations and conditions specified in this 
title for such use; and, 
D. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan. 
A copy of all of Chapter 19.84 of the Salt Lake County 
Code of Ordinances 1986, is contained in Addendum A to this 
brief. 
4. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy 
of Rule 56 is contained in Addendum B to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In November of 1987, Sandy City, hereinafter referred to 
as "Sandy", filed a complaint in the Third District Court 
seeking an extraordinary writ, declaratory and injunctive 
relief to void the approval by Salt Lake County, hereinafter 
referred to as "County", in October of 1987, of a conditional 
use permit for a Chevron station on .7 acres of land located at 
10600 South and 1300 East in the unincorporated area of the 
County. R.2-34. 
The Complaint also attacks an earlier decision of the 
County to rezone for commercial use a larger parcel of 
approximately 4.18 acres hereinafter referred to as the 
"original parcel", which includes the Chevron parcel. 
In addition to Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission, Chevron, Postero-Blecker, Inc., Yeates, 
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Priest, KJAR and Smoot are named as defendants. Chevron is the 
developer of the station at issue. Postero-Blecker, acted as 
Chevron's agent in the land acquisition. Defendant's Yeates, 
Priest, KJAR and Smoot were the owners of the original parcel. 
Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by all defendants 
in January, 1988. R.75, 125, 155. Sandy also filed its own 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R.151, and a Motion to Strike the 
affidavits and certain other documents filed by Chevron. R.173. 
On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the Motions for 
Summary Judgment and the Motion to Strike. At the hearing, 
Salt Lake County filed the certified record with the Court of 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Salt Lake County 
Commission proceedings regarding the Chevron application and 
the zoning for the original parcel. Sandy objected to the 
certification of the record. The Motion to Strike was denied 
by the Court. All other motions were taken under advisement by 
the Court. R. 219. 
On February 9, 1988, Sandy City wrote a letter to the 
Court asking that additional documents relating to development 
by McDonald's Corporation of a parcel of land adjoining the 
Chevron parcel be certified by the Court as part of the record. 
R.223. The County responded in a letter to the Court dated 
February 11, 1988. R.225. In order that the Court could 
formally rule on which documents should be considered part of 
the administrative record, the County filed a Motion Concerning 
Certification of the Record, which was heard by the Court on 
February 25, 1988. R.228. At the hearing, the Court 
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formally ordered certification of the record and provided that 
the additional documents requested by Sandy be included in the 
record. R.252. The certified record was filed with the Court 
in accordance with the order requiring certification entered on 
March 3, 1988. R.255.1/ 
On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum Decision 
granting defendants* Motions for Summary Judgment and denying 
Sandy's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. 
R.259. On April 8, 1988, the Court entered its Order of 
Judgment and Dismissal. R.265. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On April 5, 1987, defendant Yeates applied to have 
the original parcel rezoned from residential R-l-8 to 
residential R-M/ZG^ and commercial C-2. The Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission, after hearing the matter, recommended to 
the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County that the 
application be approved. The hearing on the application was 
approved on August 5, 1987, by the Board of County 
Commissioners. R.102. 
2. On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, as agent for 
Chevron, applied for a conditional use permit to build a 
Chevron station on .7 acres of the original parcel. R.20. 
1/The certified administrative record is contained in envelopes 
1 through 6. Each envelope contains a numbered index of the 
documents within the envelope. The Chevron record is in 
envelopes 3 and 4. The McDonalds record is in envelope 1 and 
2, and the zoning of the original parcel is in envelope 5 and 6. 
^/The ZC designation attached certain conditions limiting the 
height of buildings and the nature of uses that could be 
developed on the original property. R.18. 
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3. The County Planning Commission heard the matter on 
September 22, 1987, at which time evidence was presented 
concerning the application. R.107-111. The matter was 
continued by the County Planning Commission until October 13, 
1987, at which time, the application was approved after 
additional evidence was presented. R.112-115. 
4. Oral evidence presented at the County Planning 
Commission hearings included the following: 
a. Recommendations in favor of the application by 
residents in the area. R.110,111. 
b. Testimony by representatives of Chevron of a 
need for the service in the area. R.113. 
c. Recommendations for preliminary approval by the 
Planning staff subject to certain conditions. R.108. 
d. Testimony in support of the application from the 
White City Community Council and from the United Association of 
Community Councils. R.110. 
e. Testimony from Chevron officials estimating the 
costs of the project as $175,000. R.108. 
5. The administrative record from the County Planning 
Commission for the Chevron station includes the conditional use 
application, envelope 3 #1; minutes of the hearings, envelope 3 
#8; favorable written recommendations from the County Board of 
Health, the Fire Department Flood Control Division, the 
Planning Staff, other agencies and the White City Community 
Council, envelope 3 #2; a letter in opposition from Sandy, 
envelope 3 #5; findings of the Planning Commission and the 
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objections thereto from Sandy, envelope 3 #9, 10; The Little 
Cottonwood District Development Plan (Master Plan) envelope 3 
#11; a number of site plans and the building permit application 
from Chevron, envelope 3 #12-16• 
6. On October 21, 1987, the Board of County 
Commissioners upheld the County Planning Commission decision by 
denying the appeal of Sandy City, envelope 3 #4. 
7. The Chevron permits were obtained separately from 
any other potential development within the original parcel and 
Chevron will not develop any other land within the original 
parcel. R.180; Envelope 3. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The land use issues in the conditional use application 
for the Chevron station were thoroughly aired before the County 
Planning Commission and were reviewed by the Board of County 
Commissioners. Earlier hearings were also held before the 
County Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners 
with regard to the zoning of the original parcel containing the 
Chevron parcel. Judicial review of a zoning decision is 
limited to a determination as to whether there is a reasonable 
basis for the decision. The review is on the record and is not 
a de novo hearing. 
In this matter, the record supports the decision of the 
County Planning Commission approving the Chevron station. The 
station will provide a new service for the area and is buffered 
from nearby residential development in the area. Sandy City 
has approved commercial development across the street, changing 
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the character of the area and making commercial development 
appropriate at the intersection. 
Sandy's attempt to prevent development of the gas station 
by characterizing it as urban development under Utah Code Ann. 
§10-2-418, is contrary to Sandy's own evidence. Only when the 
estimated cost projections of a commercial development exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases, is the County limited in its 
ability to approve such development under §10-2-418. Land 
values and the cost projections for the adjacent McDonalds 
development and for other possible future development of 
adjoining parcels should not be included in the cost 
projections for the Chevron station. When such costs are 
excluded from Sandy's own evidence, the cost projections for 
the Chevron station fall far below the $750,000 figure. 
The District Court properly ruled that the Chevron 
station was not urban development, and that the record 
supported the approval by the County of the conditional use 
permit for the Chevron station. There are no disputed relevant 
facts in the matter and therefore the District Court correctly 
granted defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED UTAH 
STATUTES APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE 
A. THIS CASE IS NOT AN ANNEXATION CASE. 
Sandy, in its complaint and now in its brief on appeal, 
treats this case as if the Court is reviewing an annexation 
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case. With the exception of existing islands and peninsulas, 
Utah law requires that property owners must initiate annexation 
of property to a municipality by filing a petition signed by a 
majority of the property owners. Utah Code Ann. §10-2-416 
(1979). See also Paulsen v. Hooper Water Improvement District, 
656 P.2d 459 (Ut. 1982). No petition for annexation of the 
Chevron property to Sandy City was filed by the owners of the 
property. Obviously, Chevron does not want the property to be 
part of Sandy since Sandy opposed its development. There is no 
provision in the law that mandates property owners to annex 
their property to cities. 
Although the County believes the property more logically 
belongs in the County rather than in Sandy City, that issue is 
not before the Court. The only issue before the Court relating 
to annexation law is whether the County was in any way 
restricted under §10-2-418 from approving this development. 
B. THE CHEVRON DEVELOPMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §10-2-418. 
The record is clear that the Chevron development was 
approved separately from the later approved McDonalds 
development and from other potential development of nearby 
parcels of land. No allegation is made by Sandy that the 
Chevron development by itself fails to meet any County zoning 
ordinance requirement such as acreage, parking or yard spaces. 
Yet Sandy contends that the Chevron development must 
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be lumped together with the McDonalds and other potential 
developments located within the original parcel as multiphases 
of one development .3./ The County submits Sandy misconstrues 
the applicable statutory provisions. 
Utah Code Ann, §10-2-418 as pertinent, reads as follows: 
10-2-418. Urban Development Restrictions. Urban 
development shall not be approved or permitted 
within one-half mile of a municipality in the 
unincorporated territory which the municipality 
has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy 
declaration, if a municipality is willing to annex 
the territory proposed for such development under 
the standards and requirements set forth in this 
chapter;... 
the term "urban development" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§10-1-104(11) which states: 
"Urban development" means a housing subdivision 
involving more than 15 residential units with an 
average of less than one acre per residential 
unit, or a commerical or industrial development 
for which cost projections exceed $750,000.00 for 
any or all phases. 
The common understanding of a "phased" development is where one 
developer obtains approval and builds part of a development 
such as, for example, the first forty units (the first phase) 
of a proposed eighty unit condominium project. The management, 
^Although Sandy contends this development should be considered 
as the same development as the McDonalds development, it failed 
to join McDonalds as a party to this suit. Instead, Sandy has 
brought a separate action in the District Court against 
McDonalds. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, et al., C88-3898. 
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parking, amenities and design of the different phases are 
usually interrelated. In such a case the County would have the 
ability to estimate the costs of future phases of a development 
at the time it reviews the plans for the first phase. That is 
not a situation where the developments are related only by the 
fact that they have been carved out of the same original 
parcel. In such a case, the County has no way of computing the 
estimated cost of possible nearby commercial developments as 
part of the process of estimating the cost of the first 
development. In this particular case, the McDonalds parcel 
happened to develop within a short time of the Chevron parcel. 
However, that is not likely to be the case in most instances. 
Sandy contends the Chevron development is part of a 
commercial subdivision of the original parcel. However, the 
legislature has specifically excluded commercial subdivisions 
from the definition of subdivision in the enabling legislation 
which permits counties to regulate subdivision approval. See 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-27 (1953). Sandy has made no contention 
herein that the development required subdivision approval. In 
addition, the legislature in defining urban development in 
§10-1-104(11), used the term "subdivision" only in defining 
urban development for purposes of residential development. The 
term "subdivision" is not included in a definition of 
commercial or industrial development. 
Sandy also contends that the cost of land should be part 
of the estimated cost of a commercial development in 
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determining when the $750,000.00 figure is reached. Analysis 
of the §10-2-418 leads to the opposite conclusion. First, 
since the statute used the term "cost" and not "value"; cost of 
land will depend almost entirely upon when the land was 
purchased by the current developer. Sandy's interpretation 
would cause an arbitrary result depending on how long land has 
been owned by the developer. 
Second, the County has no practical way of determining 
the cost of land as it does for the cost of proposed 
improvements. Building permit fees are based on estimated cost 
of improvements which the developer must submit as part of the 
building permit application. Therefore, the County Building 
Inspection Division personnel have knowledge concerning the 
cost of the improvements. This is not true with regard to the 
cost of land. 
Third and most important, the cost of land has no 
relationship to the purpose of §10-2-418, that of limiting the 
ability of County to approve substantial physical improvements 
to land which could affect an area which a city may annex in 
the future. It is the improvements to the land, not the land 
itself, that affect planning decisions and impact an area. The 
term "development" relates to construction which changes the 
character of the land. Citv of Louisville v. District Court, 
City of Boulder, 543 P.2d 67 (Colo. 1975). 
If the land cost is excluded from Sandy's own evidence of 
cost for the Chevron development, the cost of the development 
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does not exceed $750,000.00.4/ 
POINT II 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT UPHOLDING THE COUNTY'S APPROVAL OF THE 
CHEVRON CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. 
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS LIMITED TO A 
DETERMINATION BY THE COURT THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE 
IN THE RECORD DEMONSTRATING A REASONABLE BASIS IN 
SUPPORT OF THE DECISION OF THE COUNTY APPROVING 
THE CHEVRON CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on a number of occasions 
that the court will not interfere with zoning decisions of 
local jurisdictions unless there is no reasonable basis 
whatsoever to justify the decision and therefore the action 
must be regarded as arbitrary and capricious. Marshall v. Salt 
Lake Citv, 141 P.2d 704 (Ut. 1943); Navlor v. Salt Lake Citv 
Corporation, 398 P.2d 27 (Ut. 1969); Dowse v. Salt Lake Citv 
Corporation, 255 P.2d 723 (Ut. 1953); Crestwood Holladav 
Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Enqh Floral Company, 545 P.2d 1150 
(Ut. 1976); Gavland v.Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633 (Ut. 1961). 
This same standard of review was applied to a decision by 
Salt Lake County approving a conditional use permit in the case 
of Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Ut. 1979). 
Review of a decision by local government board through an 
action seeking an extraordinary writ is limited to a 
determination as to whether the local board exceeded its 
-^'Sandy's appraisal estimates the Chevron development to cost 
between $660,000 and $760,000 including land costs of 
$210,000. The appraisal includes the cost of fixtures and 
equipment. R. 133. 
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jurisdiction or abused its descretion in rendering its 
decision. Rule 65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In the case of Peatross v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Ut. 1976), the Court held that 
such a review is on the record and that the complaining party 
is not entitled to a de novo trial. The Court stated at page 
"The standard rule is that appellate 
jurisdication is the authority to review the 
actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal upon 
the record made in that tribunal and to affirm, 
modify or reverse such action or judgment. 
Correlated to this is the principle that 
ordinarily where the lower tribunal, acting within 
the scope of its authority, conducted a hearing 
and arrived at a decision, the reviewing court 
will examine only the certified records; and will 
not interfere with the matters of discretion or 
upset the actions of the lower tribunal except 
upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess 
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside 
of reason the action must be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious." 
The record before the district court in this case 
includes an extensive administrative record in addition to the 
affidavits and documents filed by the parties in support of the 
motions for summary judgment. The District Court properly held 
that the judicial review was limited to a review of the record 
and that Sandy was not entitled to a de novo trial. 
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD WAS PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
There is no specific procedure set forth in Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure for certifying an administrative record of 
proceedings to the district court. Rule 56(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure relates to the filing of affidavits 
and is not relevant to the issue of certification of an 
existing administrative record to the courts. The County 
transmitted the administrative record to the district court 
from the County Planning Commission and filed it with the court 
at the summary judgment hearing. Counsel for Sandy was allowed 
to review the record during and after the hearing and to 
supplement the record. T.26, 27, 75. In addition, the County 
Planning Commission files are public documents and were 
available to Sandy during the whole administrative proceedings. 
The documents from the County Planning Commission and 
County Commission files for the McDonalds development of the 
parcel adjacent to the Chevron's parcel were made part of the 
record as requested by Sandy City. R.252. Sandy has made no 
claim on appeal that the administrative record is incomplete or 
that it has been prejudiced by the method in which the record 
was certified to the Court. Sandy's contention in its brief 
that the minutes from the McDonalds hearing before the Board of 
County Commissioners were not available is without merit as 
those minutes were made a part of the record as soon as they 
were transcribed and approved by the Board of County 
Commissioners. Envelope 1 #11. 
Co APPROVAL OF THE CHEVRON STATION WAS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE COUNTY'S CONDITIONAL USE ORDINANCE 
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Sandy claims the evidence in the Planning Commission 
record does not support the findings by the Planning Commission 
that the conditional use permit met the requirements of the 
county conditional use ordinance. The pertinent ordinance 
section reads as follows: 
19.84.090. "Conditions for approval. The 
planning commission shall not authorize a 
conditional use permit unless the evidence 
presented is such as to establish: 
A. That the proposed use at the particular 
location is necessary or desirable to provide a 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
community; and, 
B. That such use will not, under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious 
to property or improvements in the vicinity; and, 
C. That the proposed use will comply with 
the regulations and conditions specified in this 
title for such use; and, 
D. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan." 
The Planning Commission made specific findings in the 
Chevron application with regard to all of the required criteria 
for approval of a conditional use under the ordinance. 
Re 116-117. The County submits the record supports these 
findings. There is testimony in the record from Chevron 
representatives as to the market need for a service station in 
the area and from residents in the area supporting the 
desirability for a service station. There are favorable 
recommendations from the County Fire Department, Health 
Department, Flood Control Division and other agencies. The 
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County Traffic Engineer approved the site plan. There is also 
a favorable recommendation from the County Development Services 
Division setting conditions which appropriately buffer the 
station from the residential development in the area. This 
evidence supports the finding of the Planning Commission that 
the development will provide a service to the community and 
will not be detrimental to the vacinity. 
The Planning Commission finding that the development is 
consistent with the Little Cottonwood District Master Plan is 
supported by a number of provisions in the plan itself.-^ / The 
Little Cottonwood District Master Plan is a ten year plan 
approved in 1976 which is primarily applicable to development 
through 1985, MP.3. It is not intended as a firm guide for 
every development and provides more intensive uses may be 
appropriate in the long term. MP. 5. The plan provides that 
commerical development should take place at intersections 
MP.41, and adjacent to existing development MP.10. The 
proposed development is consistent with all of those standards 
in the plan. Since 1976, a great amount of growth has taken 
place in the southern part of the county including a major 
commercial development approved by Sandy across the street from 
the Chevron development. This growth, in addition to the Sandy 
approval of commercial development across the street, 
constituted a de facto amendment of the master plan which 
5/ The Little Cottonwood District Development Plan is 
contained in the record in envelope 3, number 11. Citations to 
the master plan will be designated in this brief as MP and the 
appropriate page number. 
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should be interpreted on the basis of today's factual 
situtation. Navlor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 410 P.2d 764 
(Ut. 1966); Town of Bedford v. Mt. Kesco, 33 N.Y.S,2d 178, 306 
N.E.2d 155 (1973); Bone v. Citv of Lewiston, 693 P.2d 1046 (Id. 
1964) . 
D. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BASED ON THE RECORD IN THIS CASE. 
Sandy argues that it should have been allowed to take 
depositions and conduct extensive discovery in this case in 
order to develop evidence. Since judicial review in this 
matter is based upon the record and is not a de novo 
proceeding, Sandy has no right to conduct such discovery. More 
importantly/ Sandy's contention that there are factual issues 
in dispute is based solely upon Sandy's own version of the law 
which the District Court correctly rejected. If land costs and 
costs of other proposed developments within the original parcel 
are excluded from cost projections, then the evidence submitted 
from both Sandy and Chevron showed the Chevron development to 
be less than $750,000. 
Likewise, the master plan, which is part of the record, 
speaks for itself as to whether this development is consistent 
with its intent. The Planning Commission so found and there is 
ample support in the record for that finding. When the 
district court resolved the legal issues in this case, there 
remained no relevant factual disputes. The County submits that 
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the Court correctly resolved the legal issues and, therefore, 
summary judgment was appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The conditional use permit for a Chevron gas station in 
this case has been reviewed by the County Planning Commission, 
the County Commission and the District Court. This is the 
fourth level of review of the facts in this case. This review 
should be limited to a determination of the legal issues in the 
case and to a determination that the District Court correctly 
found that there was evidence in the record demonstrating a 
reasonable basis for the decision of the County approving the 
Chevron Development. 
The County submits that the District Court correctly held 
that the Chevron gas station was not urban development under 
§10-2-418 and that the record fully supported the decision of 
Salt Lake County approving the conditional use permit for the 
Chevron gas station. Upon this basis, Salt Lake County submits 
that the decision of the District Court should be upheld. 
DATED this J*7 day of October, 1988. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
By. 
KENT So LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
(R556+) 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
19.84.010 
Chapter 19.84 
CONDITIONAL USES 
Sections: 
19.34.010 
19.84.020 
19.84.030 
19.34.040 
19.84.050 
19.34.060 
19.84.070 
19.84.080 
19.84.090 
19.34.100 
19.84.110 
19.84.120 
19.84.130 
19.84.140 
Purpose. 
Conditional use permit 
required when. 
Application requirements— 
Fee. 
Public hearing. 
Determination of commission. 
Delegation of approval 
authority. 
Policies established. 
Review by planning 
commission. 
Conditions for approval. 
Appeal of planning director 
decision. 
Appeal of planning commission 
decision. 
Inspection. 
Time limit. 
Sale of alcoholic beverages. 
19.84.010 Purpose. 
The purpose of this chapter is to allow the 
proper integration into the county of uses which 
may be suitable only in certain locations in the 
county or zoning district, or only if such uses are 
designed or laid out on the site in a particular 
manner. (Prior code § 22-31-1) 
19.84.020 Conditional use permit required 
when. 
A conditional use permit shall be required for 
all uses listed as conditional uses in the district 
regulations or elsewhere in this title. A condi-
tional use permit may be revoked upon failure in 
compliance with conditions precedent to the 
original approval of the permit or for any vio-
lation of this title occurring on the site for which 
the permit was approved. (Ord. 947 § 2, 1986: 
prior code § 22-31-2(part)) 
19.84.030 Application requirements—Fee. 
A. Application for a conditional use permit 
shall be made by the property owner or certified 
agent thereof to the planning commission. 
B. Accompanying Documents. Detailed site 
plans drawn to scale and other drawings neces-
sary to assist the planning commission in arriv-
ing at an appropriate decision. 
C. Fee. The fee for any conditional use permit 
shall be as provided for in Section 3.52.040 of 
this code. (Prior code § 22-31-2(1)—(3)) 
19.84.040 Public hearing. 
No public hearing need be held; however, a 
hearing may be held when the planning commis-
sion shall deem such a hearing to be necessary in 
the public interest. 
A* The development services division direc-
tor may delegate to the planning director the 
holding of the hearing. 
B. The development services division direc-
tor shall submit to the planning commission a 
record of the hearing, together with a report of 
findings and recommendations relative thereto, 
for the consideration of the planning commis-
sion. 
C Such hearing, if deemed necessary, shall be 
held not more than thirty days from the date of 
application. The particular time and place shall 
be established by the development services divi-
sion director. 
D. The development services division direc-
tor shall publish a notice of hearing in a news-
paper of general circulation in the county not less 
than ten days prior to the date of the hearing. 
Failure of property owners to receive notice of 
the hearing shall in'no way affect the validity of 
action taken. (Ord. 982 § 20, 1986: prior code § 
22-31-2(4)) 
19.34.050 Determination of commission. 
The planning commission may permit a con-
ditional use to be located within any district in 
which the particular conditional use is permitted 
by the use regulations of this title. In authorizing 
(Salt Lake County 7-38) 
y.ot.ujKj 
ay conditional use the planning commission 
lail impose such requirements and conditions 
3 required by law and any additional conditions 
3 may be necessary for the protection of adja-
snt properties and the public welfare. Such con-
Ltions of approval may include but shall not be 
mited to limitations or requirements as to the 
eight, size, location and design of structures, 
mdscaping, density, ingress-egress, fencing, 
arking or lighting. Height, density and size 
jquirements for structures in each zone are 
laximums and may be reduced or modified as 
Dnditions to the approval of any conditional use 
ppiication. (Ord. of 5/29/85; prior code § 
2-31-2(5)(part)> 
J .34.060 Delegation of approval authority. 
The planning commission may delegate to the 
sveiopment services division director the 
ithority to approve, modify or deny all or part 
Tthe conditional uses set forth in this title. (Ord. 
32 § 21, 1986: prior code § 22-31-2(5)(part)) 
J .84.070 Policies established. 
The planning commission shall establish poi-
ies regarding landscaping, fencing, lighting, 
igress-egress, height of buildings, etc., to guide 
Le decision of the development services division 
rector to ensure consistency in the issuance of 
mditionai use permits. (Ord. 982 § 22, 1986: 
ior code § 22-31-2(5)(part)) 
> .34.080 Review by planning commission. 
The development services division director is 
ithorized to bring any conditional use permit 
^plication before the planning commission if. 
. his opinion, the general public interest will be 
Hter served by review of the planning commis-
on. (Ord. 982 § 23, 1986: prior code § 
>-31-2(5)(part)) 
> .34.090 Conditions for approval. 
The planning commission shall not authorize 
:onditional use permit unless the evidence pre-
nted is such as to establish: 
A. That the proposed use at the particular 
location is necessary or desirable to provide a 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
community; and 
B. That such use will not, under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to 
property or improvements in the vicinity: and 
C. That the proposed use will compiy with the 
regulations and conditions specified in this title 
for such use; and 
D. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan. (Prior code § 
22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.34.100 Appeal of planning director 
decision. 
Any person shall have the right to appeal the 
decision of the development services director to 
the planning commission by filing a letter with 
the planning commission within ten days of the 
development services director's decision, stating 
the reason for the appeal and requesting a hear-
ing before the planning commission at the ear-
liest regular meeting of the commission, (Ord. 
979 § 3, 1986: prior code § 22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.34.110 Appeal of planning commission 
decision. 
A. Any person shall have the right to appeal to 
the board of county commissioners any decision 
rendered by the planning commission by filing in 
writing, and in triplicate, stating the reasons for 
the appeal with the board of county commis-
sioners within ten days following the date upon 
which the decision is made by the planning com-
mission. After receiving the appeal the county 
commission may reafHnn the planning commis-
sion decision, remand the matter to the planning 
commission for further consideration, or set a 
date for a public hearing. 
B. Notification of Planning Commission. 
The board of county commissioners shall notify 
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19.84.110 
the planning commission of the date of the 
review, in writing, at least seven days preceding 
the date set for hearing so that the planning com-
mission may prepare the record for the hearing. 
C Determination by Board of County Com-
missioners. The board of county commissioners 
after proper review of the decision of the plan-
ning commission may affirm, reverse, alter or 
remand for further review and consideration any 
action taken by the planning commission. (Ord. 
1004 § 2, 1987: prior code § 22-31-2(6)) 
19.84.120 Inspection. 
Following the issuance of a conditional use 
permit by the planning commission the director 
of building inspection shall approve an applica-
tion for a building permit pursuant to Chapter 
19.94 of this title and shall ensure that develop-
ment is undertaken and completed in com-
pliance with the permits. (Prior code § 
22-31-2(7)) 
19.84.130 Time limit. 
Approval of the conditional use application by 
the planning commission or the development 
services director shall expire twenty-four months 
after the date of the approval decision (see Sec-
tion 19.02.070) unless the applicant has obtained 
the conditional use permit and a building permit, 
where required, for the use within the twenty-
four-month period. A twelve-month extension 
can be obtained subject to paying an extension 
fee equal to 1.0 times the original filing fee. (Ord. 
963 § 1,1986: prior code § 22-31-2(8)) 
19.84.140 Sale of alcoholic beverages. 
Ac The planning commission shall authorize 
a conditional use permit to sell alcoholic bev-
erages except Class A beer outlets and Class B 
beer outlets where it is determined by the plan-
ning commission: 
1. That the use is not in the immediate prox-
imity of any school, church, library, public play-
ground, or park; 
2. That the proposed use at a particular loca-
tion is necessary and desirable to provide the 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
community; and 
3. That such use will not, under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to 
property or improvements in the vicinity; and 
4. That the proposed use will comply with 
regulations and conditions specified in this title 
for such use: and 
5. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan. 
B. All conditional use permits for uses dispen-
sig alcoholic beverages to be consumed on the 
premises are subject to an annual review, and all 
applications for a conditional use permit for con-
sumption of liquor or beer on the premises must 
be accompanied by a payment of fees as provided 
in Section 3.52.040. The fees are considered rea-
sonable because of the costs of investigation and 
studies necessary for the administration hereof. 
C. The granting of any permit by the planning 
commission to dispense alcoholic beverages is 
subject to review by the county commission. The 
denial of any permit by the planning commission 
to dispense alcoholic beverages is subject to 
review by the district courts. All appeals of plan-
ning commission decisions to the board of coun~ 
ty commissioners or the district courts must be 
filed with the appropriate body within thirty days 
from the date of the planning commission deci-
sion. (Ord. 804, 1982: prior code § 22-31-4) 
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ADDENDUM MB 
Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure 
Rule 56, Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon ail or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon* The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavitSc The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for triaL If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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